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prised Place, and the cooler heads among the reformers out of Parliament—how greatly it surprised those who, while actively and energetically on the popular side, had no sympathy with Hunt, and with the reception which Hunt gave to the bill in the House of Commons. Place obtained his first news of the bill from a reporter of the *Morning Chronicle*. "It was so very much beyond anything that I had expected," he wrote, "that had it been told me by a person unused to proceedings in the House, I should have supposed that he had made a mistake." In the second place, the narrative quoted by Mr. Wallas from Place's papers show how perilously near to revolution England came, after Earl Grey had resigned. Place's story leaves the impression that had the Duke of Wellington taken office, there must inevitably have been collisions between the troops and the people.

From a student's point of view, Mr. Wallas has handled admirably the enormous mass of material at his disposal. Wherever possible he has allowed Place to tell his own story, and very largely he leaves it to the reader to form his own estimate of Place, and the singularly important, though unobtrusive part Place played in the history of English politics in the first half of the nineteenth century.

EDWARD PORRITT.

Kaiser Wilhelm I. VON ERICH MARCKS. (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot. 1897. Pp. xiii, 370.)

If a historical biography is to be anything more than a mechanical mixture of biography and history, the biographer must of course establish the causal nexus between his hero and the times in which the hero figured. Marcks attacks this problem upon both its sides: he considers not only the influence which William exercised upon his times, but also the influence which the times exercised upon William. In studying his hero's character he not only utilizes the direct testimony of those who knew the prince, the king, the emperor; he also considers the formative forces of heredity, tradition and environment, and endeavors to trace the modifying influences exercised by persons and by events. In his attempt to determine William's share in events, he is not content to say that the king rendered such a decision or gave such a command; he tries to show who or what made the king act in that particular way. At every critical juncture he endeavors to get inside of William's mind and find out what was going on there. Where the evidence is inconclusive and where there is no evidence, he falls back upon inferences from character. The historical and the biographical elements in the book are thus connected by a double bond: history is employed to account for William's character and explain its development, and the biographic result—the complete picture of William's views, sentiments and aspirations—is used to throw new light upon the history of his reign.

In its central purpose the book is a study in psychology, and to this purpose the history of the times and the story of the visible life are both sub-

ordinated. Allusion to well-known events frequently takes the place of narration; facts are set forth in detail only where the writer seeks to place upon them a new interpretation. The book differs from the ordinary biography very much as the novels of James and of Bourget differ from the novel of action; and, like these, it gives something of the impression of a new *genre*.

Written originally for the voluminous *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, Marcks's sketch was of course intended for what the Germans call "the cultured public." From the majority of the German popular works that deal with the founders of the new empire it differs, however, not only in method but in spirit. It is remarkably fair and frank. Marcks is a monarchist and a nationalist; to his approval of the achievements of William's reign he adds warm admiration for William's character; but he does not hesitate to define to himself and to his readers the grounds and the limits of his admiration. He recognizes the defects as well as the merits of the man; he notes the mistakes as well as the triumphs of the ruler. It is, he declares, "a false piety that desires to conceal . . . the reverse side of brilliant times" (p. 294.)

William's father, Frederick William III., was an honest, well-meaning, conscientious, industrious, dull man, who found it very difficult to make up his mind on any matter of consequence—possibly because he had so little mind to make up. Queen Louise was his superior, both in intellect and in character. From these parents William and his elder brother, afterwards Frederick William IV., derived an unequal inheritance. The crown-prince had all his mother's quickness of intellect and all his father's weakness of will. William had all his father's best qualities, something of his mother's intelligence, and all her strength of purpose.

On these two natures tradition and environment exercised a very different influence. William, Marcks insists, was before all things *altpreussisch*. His faith was naïve, dogmatic Protestantism of the old school. His intellectual point of view was that of the rationalistic eighteenth century. His aspirations were for the aggrandizement of Prussia through successful war. As a boy he witnessed Prussia's deepest abasement; its reorganization by the efforts of Stein, Scharnhorst and their associates; its re-establishment by the War of Liberation. He was too young, as Marcks observes, to understand or be strongly influenced by the social reforms of Stein; the reaction in his mind was rather against French revolutionary tendencies than against the older Prussian institutions.

The forces which worked most strongly upon the mind of the crown-prince were of quite another sort. They were furnished by that great reaction against eighteenth-century rationalism which begot mysticism in religion and clericalism in the churches; which expressed itself in literature as romanticism; and which in the field of politics and law produced the historical school. The older brother, with his more alert and more receptive mind and his weaker character, was swept off his feet by this current of feeling and opinion. His conception of church and state became and remained medieval. On William's "leathery nature"—to quote

his own phrase, used in a different connection (p. 85)—this movement exercised no visible influence.

To all this it should be added that during the father's long reign Prince William's activity was restricted to the army. The crown-prince was educated to be king; William to be a general. In military matters he became an expert. In politics, European, German, and Prussian, his views, at the age of forty-three, were not those of a statesman, but those of a Prussian officer.

In 1840, when his brother became king, William's position was changed. Frederick William IV. was childless, and William was recognized as "Prince of Prussia." He became president of the ministry and of the council of state; he was made governor of Pomerania; and during the king's foreign journeys he was more than once charged with the conduct of the general affairs of the kingdom. After 1850, however, the differences of opinion between the brothers in matters both of foreign and of domestic policy became so marked that William drew back again into purely military life. In matters domestic, William objected to the sacrifice of the powers of the crown. He objected to the tolerably harmless United Diet of 1847; he objected much more strongly to the concessions made in the following year to armed revolutionists. He felt, nevertheless, that the king, having granted a representative constitution, should live up to it, and he held himself wholly aloof from the Tory reaction of 1850-57. It was in German affairs, however, that his opposition to the king and the Tories was most pronounced. The movements of 1848-50 in the direction of German unity under Prussian leadership appealed strongly to his ambition; and the abandonment of the narrower union on the Erfurt plan, the sacrifice of Prussian and German interests in the Hessian and Schleswig-Holstein questions—in one word, Olmütz—drove him into an attitude which to the court, and to wider circles as well, appeared "liberal."

All this goes far to explain why, on becoming regent (1858), William gave the ministry a more liberal complexion. His general course of action, however, during the next two years seems to have been determined not by liberalism, but by the sobering influences of power and of advancing age and by instincts of loyalty and generosity. The soldier longing for battle, the *Altpreuße* bent on the aggrandizement of his state, the hereditary enemy of Austria as the chief opponent of Prussia's greatness—for a time all these disappeared. Bismarck, because of his pronounced antagonism to Austria, was transferred from Frankfort to St. Petersburg—"put on ice," as he himself expressed it, "on the Neva." When the Italian war broke out, William refused to take advantage of Austria's straits. He mobilized the Prussian army in order to come to Austria's aid, and would undoubtedly have fought for her had not Austria refused to trust Prussia with the command of the federal army and patched up a hasty peace with France. During the same year, he urged a reform of the federal army, advocating a plan which would have given Austria the control of all South Germany. It is a singular chapter of Prussian

history, which the reviewer has nowhere seen so frankly written. In December, 1861, William's Liberal premier, Prince Hohenzollern, declared to a friend that he himself was not the man for the place; that what the king needed was "an iron character, who should ruthlessly ignore or hold in check the noble sides of his [the king's] character and aim solely at the good of the state" (p. 185).

In one thing only was William *altpreussisch* during these years: in his determination to reorganize the Prussian army. The effort brought him into conflict with the Prussian Diet, necessitated a change of ministry and, in the autumn of 1862, brought Bismarck into the cabinet as prime minister. In court and official circles Bismarck had long been recognized as "ministerial timber." Sybel¹ tells us that in March, 1858, William had decided to call Bismarck into the ministry, and that this plan was abandoned only because of the sudden death of the proposed prime minister, Alvensleben. Marcks (p. 191) rejects this "tradition." He asserts that even in 1862 the king shrank from Bismarck's appointment. The obstacle, he says, was personal—"eine ganz ausgeprägte Abneigung des Königs." The king's dislike was partly due to Bismarck's extreme frankness and frequent brusqueness of speech: in 1858 Bismarck himself had assured Gerlach that he would not suit the prince, "who must be handled gently." In the king's dislike there was also an element of distrust: Bismarck, to use his own phrase again, had a reputation for "*leichtfertige Gewaltthätigkeit*." At bottom it was perhaps, as Marcks suggests, the element of genius, "*das Dämonische*," in Bismarck that repelled "the son of Frederick William III."

Bismarck was called to the premiership because he was quite willing to fight the Diet, and because he convinced the king that the conflict could be maintained on constitutional lines. He was not selected to solve the German question. William himself believed that Prussia would some day unite and rule Germany, but he had no expectation that he would live to see that day. In making Bismarck premier, he certainly had no intention of abandoning the personal direction of Prussia's policy. What happened, however, is fairly indicated by the titles of Marcks's fourth and fifth chapters: in 1862, with the opening of "The Great Decade," "The Years of William's Own Policy" closed. This result was not reached without constant friction and occasional crises. William possessed too strong a character to accept, without resistance, plans that he only partially comprehended and ventures of which he could not see the outcome. He was also, with all his ambition, too conscientious a man to do what he thought wrong. Bismarck, however, had a remarkable power of lucid statement and coercive reasoning; and when persuasion failed he did not hesitate to force the king's hand by the irresistible logic of events. In many cases William doubtless failed to see that the situation which constrained him had been deliberately created. There can be little question that in 1866 he as firmly believed Austria to be the aggressor as he believed France to be the aggressor in 1870. It does not

¹ *Begründung des deutschen Reiches*, II. 293.

escape Marcks that William's reluctances were of real value to Prussia. They minimized the impression of unscrupulousness which Bismarck's policy was too apt to arouse. Benedetti¹ also appreciates this; but his conclusion that William was really as clever as Bismarck, and a hypocrite besides, unduly exalts William's intelligence at the cost of his character.

If in the long run William realized that it was not he but his chancellor who was shaping history, his mind was too just to harbor resentment and his nature too noble for jealousy. In the long run, as Marcks asserts, and as we may well believe, William's confidence and gratitude ripened into sincere affection. After the establishment of the Empire no court intrigues, however strongly supported, were able seriously to shake Bismarck's position. The alliance between the government and the Liberals, which began in 1866 and persisted for a decade, entailed many results which the Emperor did not like; but he accepted them. The treaty of alliance with Austria in 1879 seriously distressed him, because it seemed to destroy all prospects of cordial relations with Russia; but he accepted that, too. This was the last important conflict; during the remaining eight years of William's reign we hear of no more "friction" between the Emperor and his chancellor.

William's relations with Roon and Moltke are discussed with equal acuteness and frankness. In military affairs William was at home. The reorganization of the army, Marcks maintains, was his personal work, rather than Roon's; and if the strategy of 1866 and 1870-71 was Moltke's, William was, nevertheless, really commander-in-chief in both wars. His highest title to fame, however, will always rest on the facts that he knew men as few men know their fellows; that he selected great men for great tasks, with little reference to his own likes or dislikes; and that having found the right men he retained them in the face of opposition in the chambers, in the press, and even in his own household.

Of his book, as a contribution to history, Marcks speaks with great modesty. He has used, he says, only printed material. He has used, however, all that there is—witness his excellent bibliography—and he has used it with great discretion. He has, in many cases, placed upon known facts a new and more reasonable interpretation. His book is one which no student of the period can afford not to read.

MUNROE SMITH.

The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. Edited by REUBEN GOLD THWAITES, Secretary of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Vols. V.-XV. (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company. 1897, 1898. Pp. 298, 330, 312, 314, 315, 328, 279, 277, 272, 289, 250.)

V. WITH this volume begins the actual settlement of Canada, in other words the first few settlers who came for the purpose of tilling the

¹ "William I. and Prince Bismarck," in *Studies in Diplomacy* (English translation), Macmillan and Co., 1896.